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Old programs rewritten
According to Government officials, the 
Tymoshenko Action Program expands 
and concretizes the action program 
signed not so long ago by the ruling 
coalition. In its turn, the latter reiterated 
some 90% of the agreement on a united 
opposition signed by BYT and NU–NS in 
February 2007. To the same extent, that 
oppositional agreement was a reiteration 
of the coalition agreement in 2006 that 
BYT, Nasha Ukraina and SPU signed shortly 
before coalition talks collapsed. Strangely 
enough, the coalition action program 
presented in the “Agreement to Set up an 
Anti-Crisis Coalition” was also little more 
than an abridged version of the 2006 
coalition agreement among BYT, NU and 
SPU. 
Over the last two years, in short, coalition 
programs have changed very little. Their 
content and main sections remained 
unaltered. What few changes there 
were, have been related only to specific 
promises sprinkled throughout the given 
program. Sometimes, the parties changed 
the year of expected accession to the WTO 
or the year the ban on selling farmland 
would be lifted. Sometimes, they added 
or removed specific ticklish issues and 
innovations, such as Ukraine’s membership 
in NATO, and so on. 
Given the fact that government policy 
made no headway over the last two years, 
the Government Action Program presented 
by Yulia Tymoshenko, its goals and 
objectives remain urgent and important. 
Old mistakes repeated
In the text, this heritage means that, while 
containing all the positive aspects of its 
predecessors, this program reflects all the 
drawbacks of previous programs as well. 
These are the same old problems for 
which experts have upbraided Ukrainian 
Governments and coalitions in the past. 
First among these is the absence of any 
link between the program-drafting process 
and the budget-making process. From 
year to year, the State Budget is drafted 
in almost complete isolation from any 
Government Action Program. There are no 
regulatory mechanisms that might link 
these two processes or make one of them 
depend on the other.
More broadly, the Government 
Action Program has a completely 
incomprehensible place in the state 
planning process. The Constitution and 
the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers—both 
the current law and the Bill that is being 
prepared to replace it—do nothing to link 
Government Action Programs with other 
state programs or the State Budget. 
Furthermore, it remains hard to understand 
whether the particular Program is intended 
to be for one year or for the entire term of 
office of a given Cabinet of Ministers. The 
Tymoshenko Government has announced 
that its program is a strategy for the entire 
term of the Verkhovna Rada and will be 
supplemented with annual Action Plans 
for the Cabinet of Ministers and specific 
ministries that add the details to this core 
Program. 
Too many priorities 
However, even as a strategy, this Program 
contains too many “top priority” objectives 
for the Government to fulfill within such 
a short period as five years, which is its 
theoretically maximum term of office. Like 
its predecessor two years ago, this Program 
emphasizes the need to implement more 
than a dozen various reforms. However, it is 
physically impossible to implement all these 
reforms simultaneously, for no more reason 
than the fact that significant public funding 
is needed to implement each of them. Also, 
before implementing these reforms, the 
impact of their implementation needs to be 
assessed. 
Clearly, it would make sense to begin 
implementing certain reforms only after 
other, more urgent objectives have been 
met. As before, however, the current 
Government Action Program fails to 
demonstrate that the Members of this 
Government understand what the logic of 
their steps should be or what kind of the 
impact they will have.
When there are too many goals, some of 
them inevitably contradict each other. 
How can the Government cut taxes and 
increase social outlays at the same time? 
Or, having proposed the option of paying 
for residential services with depreciated 
soviet savings, how can the Government 
prevent a short-term wave of non-payment 
for such services? And how does this 
correlate with the Government’s plans to 
reform the residential services sector and 
provide incentives for a market economy 
in this sector? 
On 15 January, Premier Yulia Tymoshenko openly discussed her draft 
Government Action Program called “Ukrainian Breakthrough: For the people, 
not for politicians” with the public. The fact that there is such a program is 
already very positive. But judging by its content, it remains little more  
than an instrument to protect the Cabinet from being fired for 12 months, 
rather than a document that organizes and plans the work of the Government.  
ICPS analysts Viktor Chumak and Ivan Presniakov wrote this article for 
Ukrayinska Pravda, an internet publication, about what’s wrong with the new 
Government Action Program
The new Government program:  
What’s different?
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The Index of the Current Situation (ICS) 
was 96.6 in October, 9.2 points below  
the value registered in August. The Index 
of Current Personal Financial Standing  
х1 also fell 9.6 points over August-
October, to 88.0. This is a record-low 
value since June 2007. Having reached a 
record high in August 2007, the Index of 
Propensity to Consume x5 dropped  
8.7 points, to 105.2.
The Index of Economic Expectations 
(IEE) fell 6.8 points, to 93.9. Short-term 
expectations of Ukrainians deteriorated 
the most: This index x3 plunged  
15.1 points, to 84.8. 
ICPS and GfK-Ukraine economists blame 
the steep deterioration in consumer 
confidence at the beginning of Fall  
2007 on a sharp acceleration in inflation 
over this period, further depreciation 
of the US dollar against key global 
currencies, and a worsening situation on 
global financial markets in connection 
with the US mortgage crisis. In addition, 
the political situation in Ukraine was 
little comfort to the country’s consumers. 
The pre-term Verkhovna Rada election 
did not significantly change the political 
situation in Ukraine and, consequently, 
has not brought real stability.
Inflationary expectations continue to 
be reliably high among Ukrainians: the 
Index of Inflationary Expectations (IIE) 
was 185.6 in October 2007. Compared 
with August, it remained nearly flat. 
Against the background of an overall 
worsening in consumer confidence,  
the Index of Expected Changes  
in Unemployment (IECU) also 
deteriorated. This index was 117.1 in 
October 2007, a record high since June 
2006.
The survey showed that consumer 
confidence deteriorated across all 
regions, except for Kyiv. Despite this 
deterioration, optimism prevailed in 
Western and Southern Ukraine in October, 
where the CCI was 105.2 and 102.2. 
The most pessimistic expectations were 
registered in Northern and Eastern 
Ukraine, where the CCI was 83.9 and 
84.4.
Residents of major cities showed the 
most pessimistic expectations: their CCI 
was 84.3 in October, 11.2 points below 
the value registered in August. The most 
optimistic consumer confidence was in 
mid-sized cities, where the CCI was 100.3.
Consumer confidence deteriorated the 
most among poor and middle-aged 
Ukrainians. The CCI of Ukrainians with 
below-average incomes was 72.4 in 
October, or 14.8 points below the value 
registered in August. This is a record 
low for this year. The CCI of middle-aged 
Ukrainians, those aged 31–45, dropped 
11.5 points, to 92.8.
If you would like to subscribe to the 
сonsumer сonfidence bulletin, with 
its detailed analysis of the Consumer 
Confidence Index in Ukraine, contact our 
Client Relations Manager Andriy Starynskiy 
by telephone at (380-44) 484-4410, or via 
e-mail at marketing@icps.kiev.ua.
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Voters should monitor  
the Government’s program
On one hand, the Government Action 
Program is a document for the Cabinet 
of Ministers itself, a plan outlined by the 
Cabinet for itself. On the other, it is a map 
for the public to monitor how politicians 
are fulfilling their promises. The better 
and the more specific this plan is, the 
more chances that politicians will be able 
to carry it out and voters to evaluate it. 
The Action Program of the current 
Government has been written in such a 
manner that it will be very difficult to 
monitor how it is being fulfilled in a year, 
in two or in three years. Except for key 
promises, such as repaying depreciated 
savings in Oschadny Bank, the rest of 
its commitments are very vague. The 
Program also contains few specific 
deadlines. So far, the Government Action 
Program only looks like little more than 
a way to get the green light from the 
Verkhovna Rada for the next year.
The full version of this article can be found 
on the site where it was posted: http://www.
pravda.com.ua/news/2008/1/15/69756.
htm (in Ukrainian). 
For additional information, contact ICPS 
analyst Viktor Chumak by telephone 
at (380-44) 484-4400 or via e-mail at 
vchumak@icps.kiev.ua.
From August to October 2007, consumer confidence sharply deteriorated in 
Ukraine. In October, the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) stood at 95.0,  
7.7 points below the value registered in August. Prior to this drop, the CCI  
had been steadily rising since April 2007, breaking the 100-mark  
in August 2007. This meant that Ukrainian consumers were optimistic  
at the end of this summer
Consumer optimism takes a dive
Consumer Confidence Index in Ukraine
Sources: GfK Ukraine, ICPS
